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Abstract
Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) are thought to under-rely on prior knowledge in perceptual decision-
making. This study examined whether this applies to decisions of attention allocation, of relevance for ‘predictive-coding’ 
accounts of ASD. In a visual search task, a salient but task-irrelevant distractor appeared with higher probability in one display 
half. Individuals with ASD learned to avoid ‘attentional capture’ by distractors in the probable region as effectively as control 
participants—indicating typical priors for deploying attention. However, capture by a ‘surprising’ distractor at an unlikely 
location led to greatly slowed identification of a subsequent target at that location—indicating that individuals with ASD 
attempt to control surprise (unexpected attentional capture) by over-regulating parameters in post-selective decision-making.
Keywords Visual attention · Visual search · Predictive coding
Introduction
Individuals with ASD exhibit a range of sensory atypicali-
ties, such as focus on details or superior performance on 
perceptual tasks (Dakin and Frith 2005; Leekam et al. 2007), 
making the issue of ‘How can sensory processing in autism 
be better understood?’ one of the top ten research priorities 
as assessed by individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorder 
(ASD) and stakeholders (Autistica 2016). The emergent idea 
is that these atypicalities reflect altered perceptual-inference 
processes, which may be constitutive of the autistic cognitive 
profile at large. While the ‘predictive-coding’ framework 
(Friston 2010; Friston and Kiebel 2009) offers a promis-
ing approach towards a principled understanding of these 
alterations, exactly which perceptual-decision processes are 
altered in ASD remains controversial (Brock 2012; Lawson 
et al. 2014; Pellicano and Burr 2012; Van de Cruys et al. 
2014). Also, predictive coding in ASD has thus far only 
been examined for explicit decisions on stimuli that are in 
the focus of attention, that is, decisions at a post-selective 
stage of attentional processing, in terms of ‘classical’ archi-
tectures of visual selective attention (e.g., Koch and Ullman 
1985; Treisman and Gelade 1980; Wolfe 2007). But little is 
known regarding more implicit decisions—at a pre-selec-
tive, or pre-attentive, stage—on which stimuli to bring into 
the focus of attention. This is surprising in view of recent 
attentional accounts of ASD (Keehn et al. 2013, 2016; Span-
iol et al. 2018), according to which attentional abnormalities, 
in particular, a deficit in attentional reorienting (Orekhova 
and Stroganova 2014), influence developmental trajectories 
with far-reaching consequences for social-cognitive devel-
opment. For instance, abnormal orienting of attention and 
over-reliance on sensory input rather than prior knowledge 
by individuals with ASD could impact their information pro-
cessing during social interactions in developmentally impor-
tant learning phases, resulting in cascading effects on social-
cognitive functioning. Given this, the present study was 
designed to elucidate (1) which particular predictive-coding 
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processes are altered in ASD and (2) whether the alterations 
already impact pre-selective decisions determining where to 
allocate focal attention, as well as post-selective decisions 
on the objects at the attended locations.
Atypical Predictive Coding in ASD?
Predictive-coding accounts of perception (Friston 2010; 
Friston and Kiebel 2009) assume that the brain continu-
ally makes predictions, based on prior knowledge, about 
the environmental causes of the sensory inputs it receives. 
If a discrepancy between the top-down prediction and the 
actual sensory input (i.e., a prediction error) occurs, the 
brain attempts to reduce this mismatch by integrating the 
top-down prior information and the sensory input and 
adjusting its internal generative model accordingly. In this 
framework, prediction errors should be weighted by their 
precision. Errors arising from noisy, high-variance, sensory 
input would have low precision: as they do not provide reli-
able evidence that predictions can be improved by adjusting 
the internal model, they should receive only a low weight. 
In contrast, errors of high precision would be indicative of a 
systematic problem with predictions and should thus receive 
a high weight. The predictive-coding framework assumes 
that the precision is learnt from experience, and the weight 
assigned to prediction errors arising from any particular 
sensory source and context reflects the precision that an 
observer has learnt to associate with such inputs within this 
context.
While this general framework promises to yield a princi-
pled understanding of the perceptual atypicalities in ASD, 
opinions diverge with regard to how the differences between 
ASD and typically developed (TD) individuals arise. While 
the various accounts proposed agree that, in autism, per-
ception is less influenced by prior knowledge, they disa-
gree on the precise reasons why this is so. Pellicano and 
Burr’s (2012) ‘hypo-prior’ account assumes that perceptual 
atypicalities, and potentially many of the other atypicalities, 
arise because ASD individuals acquire broader, less spe-
cific, priors (termed ‘hypo-priors’); that is, their perception 
is less influenced by prior knowledge because their prior 
knowledge is less reliable. One alternative proposal is that 
sensory noise is reduced in ASD, compared to TD, individu-
als, thus making perceptual decisions less reliant on prior 
information (Brock 2012), but this has not been supported 
experimentally (Skewes et al. 2014; Skewes and Gebauer 
2016). A second alternative assumes that individuals with 
ASD assign an unduly high weight to prediction errors, 
which is unwarranted given the level of uncertainty prevail-
ing within a given context (Lawson et al. 2014; Van de Cruys 
et al. 2014). In line with this account (henceforth referred 
to as ‘precision-regulation’ account), Lawson et al. (2017) 
successfully explained their ASD group’s reduced reliance 
on prior information by a hierarchical Bayesian-learning 
model1; critically, this computational model assumed that 
ASD individuals “overestimate the volatility of the sensory 
environment”, as a result of abnormally high weighting of 
prediction errors regarding environmental volatility, and 
consequently fail to build stable expectations (but the gen-
erality of this account has been challenged, see Manning 
et al. 2017).
Atypical Predictive Coding in Pre‑attentive, as well 
as Attentional, Vision?
In all of the studies mentioned above that used visual clas-
sification tasks (Lawson et al. 2017; Skewes et al. 2014), 
there was only one stimulus in the display, and this was 
task-relevant and, thus, focally attended. However, this sce-
nario captures only part of how we deal with complex visual 
scenes, where a pre-attentive system of ‘priority’ computa-
tions determines where to allocate attention and post-selec-
tive perceptual processes then decide what the object is that 
has been brought into the focus of attention (e.g., Koch and 
Ullman 1985; Wolfe 2007). In other words, decisions about 
where to attend precede perceptual decisions, and the former 
can also be influenced by prior knowledge—as evidenced by 
the emergent literature on the guidance of visual search by 
statistically learnt ‘context’ cues (e.g., Chun and Jiang 1998) 
or acquired knowledge about where in a scene potentially 
distracting stimuli are likely to occur (Sauter et al. 2018). 
Given this, the present study was designed to establish 
whether the tendency of ASD individuals to rely less on 
prior knowledge, as compared to TD individuals, would also 
apply to decisions about where to attend at the pre-selective 
stage, as well as to perceptual decisions about objects in the 
focus of attention at the post-selective stage.
Rationale of the Present Study
To this end, we used a variant of the ‘additional-singleton’ 
visual-search paradigm (Theeuwes 1992), in which partici-
pants search for and respond to a target singleton—typi-
cally an item of a unique shape—, while ignoring a more 
salient but task-irrelevant distractor singleton—typically an 
item of a unique color. In our variant of this paradigm, the 
to-be-ignored distractor was more likely to appear in one 
specific display region (e.g., the upper region), while the 
1 In more detail, Lawson et al. (2017) devised a hierarchical Gauss-
ian filter, which performed Bayesian updating of a probabilistic 
model with three levels: the lowest level represented a prediction of 
the outcome on a particular trial, the second level the conditional 
probabilities of the different outcomes, and the third the volatility 
of the environment (i.e., the rate at which the outcome probabilities 
change).
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target appeared with equal likelihood at all possible loca-
tions—that is, the likely distractor region was probabilisti-
cally ‘cued’. Prior work has shown that TD participants can 
acquire this cue by statistical learning and use it to ‘pro-
actively’ (e.g., Geng 2014) and tonically suppress salient 
distractors occurring at the likely, or ‘frequent’, positions, as 
evidenced by such distractors generating less reaction-time 
(RT) interference—indicative of less ‘involuntary attentional 
capture’—compared to distractors occurring at unlikely, or 
‘rare’, locations (Allenmark et al. 2019; Sauter et al. 2018; 
Wang and Theeuwes 2018a; Zhang et al. 2019).
If individuals with ASD rely less on prior knowledge 
when deciding which item in the search display to attend 
to, one would expect this to be reflected in a diminished 
difference in interference between distractors appearing in 
the frequent vs. the rare distractor region. However, instead 
of being due to the prevention of attentional capture at the 
pre-selective stage, reduced RT interference from distractors 
at the frequent (vs. rare) locations that is found with TD indi-
viduals could also arise because, following mis-allocation of 
attention, and the eye gaze, to this location, they may have 
learned to more efficiently decide, at the post-selective stage, 
that the stimulus at this location is a task-irrelevant distrac-
tor rather than the response-relevant target. This would per-
mit them to disengage attention, and the eye, faster from 
this location and reallocate it to the target location, and so 
expedite the final RTs. Thus, if individuals with ASD were 
found to make less use of statistical distractor-location cues, 
this could also be attributable to them relying less on prior 
knowledge when making a perceptual classification about 
whether an attended (fixated) item is a distractor rather than 
a target, during the post-selective decision stage. To disen-
tangle these possibilities, we collected eye-tracking data in 
addition to manual RT data in our variant of the additional-
singleton paradigm. An influence of prior knowledge during 
the pre-selective stage can be assessed based on the eye-
movement data, in terms of the proportions of mis-guided 
first saccades to/fixations on the distractor—which would be 
expected to be lower for distractors at the frequent versus the 
distractor locations; and influences during the post-selective 
stage can be assessed from the durations of fixations on the 
distractor—(which would be expected to be shorter on dis-
tractors at the frequent vs. the rare locations; see, e.g., Wang 
et al. 2019).
Note that in the additional-singleton paradigm, the tar-
get and distractor locations, by design, never coincide on a 
given trial n, though the target can appear at the position of 
a distractor on the previous trial n – 1. If a distractor captures 
attention, its location needs to be suppressed ‘reactively’ 
(e.g., Geng 2014) in order for attention to be disengaged 
and reallocated to the target location, and this inhibition car-
ries over to the next trial—as evidenced by slowed RTs to a 
target on a given trial n falling at the location occupied by a 
distractor on the preceding trial n – 1 (e.g., Geyer et al. 2006; 
Kumada and Humphreys 2002; Maljkovic and Nakayama 
1996; Sauter et al. 2018). Henceforth, such trials will be 
referred to as ‘coincidence trials’. Applied to the paradigm 
variant with distractor-location probability cueing, a distrac-
tor occurring at an unlikely location—which is not subject 
to learnt, proactive suppression—would be more likely to 
capture attention compared to a distractor at a likely loca-
tion. Such a rare-location distractor would be less expected 
and so have greater surprise value when it captures atten-
tion—setting in motion reactive suppression and short-term 
prior updating processes, affecting performance on subse-
quent trials.
If individuals with ASD have difficulty with down-
weighting irrelevant prediction errors, as assumed by the 
precision-regulation account, they may sometimes overre-
act to unexpected events. Applied to the present paradigm, 
they may be expected to respond to rare-location distractors 
with more reactive suppression and/or other short-term prior 
updating processes. This would affect performance on the 
subsequent trials. Specifically, when the target occurs at the 
re-actively suppressed location, individuals with ASD may 
exhibit a larger cost on rare-location coincidence trials, as 
compared to TD individuals. By contrast, the costs may not 
differ, or differ by less, for frequent-location coincidence 
trials, that is, when the target occurs at a proactively sup-
pressed location. Thus, by examining the general distractor-
location probability-cueing effect and the coincidence costs, 
we aimed to gain insight both into how ASD individuals use 
priors during the pre-attentive stage of visual search, and 
how they update priors in response to unexpected events.
Methods
Participants
Twenty-two adults on the autism spectrum [nine female; 
age range 18–67 (mean = 30.4, SD = 13.5) years] and 
22 TD adults [nine female; age range 18–70  years 
(mean = 29.7, SD = 12.9)] were recruited from the data-
base of the Outpatient Clinic for Autism Spectrum Dis-
orders at the Department of Psychiatry, LMU Munich, as 
well as through local autism network contacts. TD par-
ticipants were recruited from the database of the LMU 
Faculty of Psychology and Pedagogics, which contains 
a large number of individuals available to take part in 
psychological studies (either psychology students, people 
generally interested in psychological studies, or people 
just wishing to earn some extra money by participating in 
psychological studies) or among local medical students. 
The TD participants were selected to, as closely as possi-
ble, match the distribution of gender and age of the group 
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of ASD participants An additional selection criterion was 
that participants had to be fluent in German (since the 
questionnaires were in German). IQ was not used as a 
selection criterion, but the mean IQs still ended up closely 
matched between the two groups.
All ASD participants had been diagnosed by a team of 
certified psychologists and psychiatrists according to the 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013) ICD-10 (WHO 
1992). None of the TD participants reported any history of 
mental illnesses or neurological deficits.
The sample size needed for 90% power was calculated 
based on the effect sizes of the distractor-location effects in 
two previous probability-cueing studies using a similar para-
digm: the study of (Wang and Theeuwes 2018a) and our rep-
lication of this study (Zhang et al. 2019). Since our previous 
study had two sessions, we calculated the effect size based 
on the first session only: our effect size was comparable to 
that reported by Wang and Theeuwes but slightly smaller 
 (dz = 1.8 compared to  dz = 2.0), and so we conservatively 
based our power calculation on that, smaller effect size. 
We then calculated the sample size required for detecting a 
between-group difference with 90% power, with one-tailed 
testing, assuming the effect size from our previous study in 
the TD group and half as large an effect in the ASD group 
(this is roughly the group difference found by Lawson et al. 
2014) as 22 participants.
Participants with and without ASD were pairwise 
matched on the ‘Wortschatztest’ (WST, Schmidt and Met-
zler 1992) IQ-Scale (ASD group mean = 105.86; TD group 
mean = 105.91), gender, and age. Both groups completed the 
Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ, Baron-Cohen et al. 2001), 
Empathy Quotient (EQ, Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 
2004), Systemizing Quotient (Baron-Cohen et al. 2003), 
Beck’s Depression Inventory (BDI, Beck et al. 2011). The 
ASD and TD groups did not differ significantly in terms of 
age or IQ. But there were significant differences between the 
two groups in the AQ, EQ, and SQ measures (see Table 1).
The study was approved by the Ethics Board of the 
LMU Department of Psychology. All participants gave 
written informed consent prior to commencing the experi-
ment and received 10 Euros per hour for their service.
Apparatus
The experiment was carried out in a sound-reduced and 
moderately lit experimental cabin. The stimuli were pre-
sented on a 21-inch LACIE CRT monitor with a screen 
resolution of 1024 × 768 pixels and a refresh rate of 
85 Hz. Movements of participants’ dominant eye were 
monitored using an Eyelink 1000 desktop-mounted system 
(SR Research, Canada), set at a sampling rate of 1 kHz. 
Stimulus presentation, response recording, and eye-move-
ment sampling were controlled via a customized Matlab 
program using the Psychtoolbox and the Eyelink Toolbox 
(Brainard 1997).
Table 1  Descriptive characteristics of the ASD and TD groups
Numbers in brackets are standard deviations
*Denotes p < 0.05
***Denotes p < 0.001
Measures ASD group (n = 22) TD group (n = 22) Group comparison Significance
AGE 30.4 (13.5) 29.7 (12.9) t(42) = 0.17, p = 0.86, BF10 = 0.3
IQ 105.9 (10.8) 105.9 (11.7) t(42) = − 0.01, p = 0.99, BF10 = 0.3
Autism-spectrum quotient score 36.5 (7.2) 15.5 (6.5) t(42) = 10.2, p < 0.001, BF10 > 1000 ***
Empathy quotient score 28.6 (13.1) 52.8 (15.2) t(42) = − 5.6, p < 0.001, BF10 > 1000 ***
Systemizing quotient score 35.5 (16.6) 25.5 (8.4) t(42) = 2.5, p < 0.05, BF10 = 3.5 *
Beck’s depression inventory score 8.9 (6.23) 5.0 (6.39) t(42) = 2.1, p < 0.05, BF10 = 1.6 *
Fig. 1  Example search display. The search target is the singleton 
shape (here the diamond shape), and the distractor is a color singleton 
(here the green item). Participants responded to the orientation of the 
bar inside the target shape (here horizontal)
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Stimuli
The search displays (see Fig. 1) were composed of eight 
colored outline shapes (circles or diamonds), arranged 
equidistantly around a virtual circle (radius of 4.4° of vis-
ual angle). The display items consisted of either one circle 
(target) and seven diamonds (non-targets), or, alternatively, 
one diamond (target) and seven circles (non-targets). In a 
certain percentage of trials, one of the non-target shapes 
(the distractor) differed in color from all the other shapes, 
being either green amongst homogeneous red shapes, or red 
amongst green shapes. All search displays were presented 
on black screen background, with a white fixation cross in 
the center. Each outline shape contained a vertical or hori-
zontal gray line inside (0.3° × 1.5°). On each trial, half of 
the internal lines, randomly chosen, were vertical and half 
horizontal.
Design
On each trial, one of the eight shapes in the search display 
was a singleton shape, either a circle among diamonds or a 
diamond among circles, randomly assigned on each trial. 
Participants had to find this—target—shape and respond to 
the orientation of the line inside it. In 66% of trials, there 
was also a uniquely colored singleton distractor, a single 
red amongst green shapes or green amongst red shapes, ran-
domly assigned on each trial. The target appeared at each 
location with equal probability, but never at the same loca-
tion as the distractor on a given distractor-present trial. The 
distractor, on the other hand, appeared with 90% probabil-
ity in one—the top or bottom—half of the search display, 
the frequent region, and with 10% probability in the other 
half, the rare region (i.e., we adopted a variant of the region 
cueing paradigm pioneered by Goschy et al. 2014). Which 
region was frequent and which rare was counterbalanced 
across participants within each group. Within each region, 
the distractor appeared at each of the four locations with 
equal probability. Participants performed 1020 trials overall, 
divided into 17 blocks of 60 trials each.
Procedure
Each trial started with the presentation of a fixation cross 
for a random duration between 1.2 and 1.45 s. This was 
followed by the search display which was shown until the 
participant responded. Participants were instructed to search 
for the uniquely shaped ‘target’ object and identify the orien-
tation of the line contained inside it, vertical or horizontal, 
as quickly and accurately as possible. They were instructed 
to press the ‘up’ arrow on the keyboard if the line was verti-
cal, and the ‘left’ arrow if it was horizontal. If a participant 
gave an incorrect response, the feedback message “incorrect 
response” was displayed for 500 ms, followed by 300 ms 
with a blank screen before the start of the next trial.
Bayes‑Factor Analysis
Bayesian analyses of variance (ANOVAs) were performed 
using JASP (http://www.jasp-stats .org) with default settings 
(i.e., r-scale fixed effects = 0.5, r-scale random effects = 1, 
r-scale covariates = 0.354). All Bayes factors reported for 
ANOVA main effects and interactions are “inclusion” Bayes 
factors calculated across matched models. Inclusion Bayes 
factors compare models with a particular predictor to models 
that exclude that predictor, providing a measure of the extent 
to which the data support inclusion of a factor in the model. 
Bayesian t tests were performed using the ttestBF function 
of the R package “BayesFactor” with the default setting (i.e., 
rscale = “medium”).
Results
The Results section is organized into two parts: The first 
reports the full manual-RT analysis, which reveals a cer-
tain, strikingly altered characteristic of ASD individuals’ 
response behavior, but offers no explanation of how this 
alteration is brought about. The second part presents an anal-
ysis of the eye-movement data, with particular focus on the 
oculomotor dynamics in the critical, altered condition, effec-
tively testing, and deciding between, alternative accounts of 
the underlying cause of altered perceptual decision-making 
in individuals with ASD.
RT Results
All RT analyses were performed on individuals’ median RTs 
after excluding trials on which a participant made an incor-
rect response (approximately 3% of trials on average).
Figure 2 depicts the RTs, and error rates, for the differ-
ent distractor conditions (distractor absent, distractor in 
rare region, distractor in frequent region), separately for 
the ASD and the TD group. Numerically, RTs were slower 
in the ASD than in the TD group (distractor-present trials: 
1173 vs. 1076 ms; distractor-absent trials: 1108 vs. 990 ms). 
However, a mixed-design ANOVA with the factors distrac-
tor condition and group failed to reveal this difference to be 
significant [main effect of group: F(1, 42) = 0.74, p = 0.39, 
ηp2 = 0.017, BFincl = 0.67]. Importantly, the main effect 
of distractor condition was significant, F(2, 42) = 101.53, 
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.71, BFincl > 1000, but not the interaction 
with group, F(1,42) = 1.17, p = 0.32, ηp2 = 0.03, BFincl = 0.37.
To break down the distractor-condition effect, we ana-
lyzed (1) the overall amount of distractor interference, 
defined as the RT difference between distractor-present trials 
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(averaged with equal weight for trials with a distractor in the 
rare and, respectively, the frequent region) and distractor-
absent trials, and (2) the distractor-location (probability-
cueing) effect, defined as the RT difference between trials 
with a distractor in the rare and, respectively, the frequent 
region (Sauter et al. 2018; Zhang et al. 2019). Distractor 
interference was somewhat lower in the ASD group (124 
vs. 156 ms in the TD group), but the difference was not 
significant [Welch two-sample t test: t(38.01) = − 1.49, 
p = 0.14, BF10 = 0.72]. Importantly, there was a significant 
probability-cueing effect [50 ms, t(43) = 4.31, p < 0.001, 
BF10 = 253], which did, however, not differ significantly 
between the ASD and TD groups [47 vs. 53 ms; Welch two-
sample t test: t(40.77) = − 0.23, p = 0.83, BF10 = 0.30]; in 
fact, the Bayesian analysis provides substantial evidence in 
favor of no difference. Thus, the individuals with ASD learnt 
to proactively suppress distractors in the frequent distractor 
region as effectively as TD individuals—at variance with 
the former being compromised in their ability to acquire 
the distractor-distribution ‘prior’ (i.e., with the hypo-prior 
account).
Target‑Position Effect
Figure 3 depicts the RTs, and average error rates, on distrac-
tor-absent trials, depending on whether the target appeared 
in the rare or the frequent distractor region, for the two par-
ticipant groups (ASD and TD). For this analysis, trials on 
which the target appeared at the same location as a distractor 
on the previous trial were removed, to rule out confounding 
of the target position effect by carry-over of inhibition of the 
distractor location on the preceding trial (see coincidence 
effects depicted in Fig. 4). A mixed-design ANOVA with the 
factors target condition and group revealed RTs to be sig-
nificantly slower for targets appearing in the frequent versus 
the rare distractor region [1055 vs. 1035 ms; F(1, 42) = 4.67, 
p = 0.036, ηp2 = 0.10, BFincl = 1.67]—replicating previous 
studies using this paradigm (Wang and Theeuwes 2018a, b; 
Zhang et al. 2019). However, this target-position effect did 
not differ significantly between the ASD and TD groups [25 
vs. 15 ms; F(1, 42) = 0.28, p = 0.60, BFincl = 0.34]—indicat-
ing that both groups acquired the same strategy of generally 
suppressing any singleton targets and distractors in the fre-
quent distractor region, in line with suppression operating 
at the level of the search-guiding priority map (see Liesefeld 
and Müller 2019, 2020; Sauter et al. 2018, 2019; 2020).
Carry‑Over of Reactive Distractor Inhibition Across Trials
Given this, we went on to test the alternative hypothesis 
that individuals with ASD react more strongly to rare, as 
compared to frequent, distractor events—by examining 
carry-over of reactive inhibition placed on the distractor 
Fig. 2  RTs and error rates as a function of distractor condition (none: 
distractor absent, rare region: distractor in rare region, freq. region: 
distractor in frequent region), separately for the ASD and TD groups. 
Error bars denote one standard error
Fig. 3  RTs and error rates as a function of the target condition (target 
in rare vs. frequent distractor region), separately for the ASD and TD 
groups. Error bars denote one standard error
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location on a given trial onto targets appearing at the same 
location on the subsequent trial. That is, we analyzed the 
 distractorn–1–targetn position coincidence trials, focusing 
exclusively on distractor-absent trials n (to assess pure 
carry-over of inhibition uninfluenced by any dynamics set in 
motion by the presence of a distractor on trial n; see Zhang 
et al. 2019). Figure 4 presents the distractor–target coin-
cidence effect—the difference in RTs between distractor-
absent trials n on which the current target did versus did not 
appear at the location of the distractor on the preceding trial 
n – 1—separately for the two groups.
A mixed-design ANOVA with target condition (target n 
in frequent vs. rare distractor region) and group (ASD vs. 
TD) as factors revealed both main effects to be significant 
[target condition: F(1, 42) = 17.02, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.29, 
BFinc > 1000; group: F(1, 42) = 7.75, p = 0.008, ηp2 = 0.16, 
BFinc = 53]; importantly, the interaction also turned out sig-
nificant, F(1, 42) = 9.53, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.19, BFinc = 76. 
The distractor–target coincidence effect (i.e., the carried-
over inhibition) was substantial and significant only for tar-
gets in the rare region [228-ms effect, t(43) = 4.1, p < 0.001, 
BF10 = 124; frequent region: 14-ms effect, t(43) = 0.96, 
p = 0.34, BF10 = 0.25]. Further, it was equally small (and 
non-significant) for both groups if the current target coin-
cided with a preceding distractor in the frequent region 
(ASD: 11-ms effect; TD: 17-ms effect); by contrast, for tar-
gets following a distractor in the rare region, the effect was 
more than five times larger for ASD than for TD individu-
als (384 vs. 71 ms, Welch two sample t test: t(33.2) = 3.05, 
p = 0.004, BF10 = 10). The negligible coincidence effect for 
targets in the frequent region is as expected: this region is 
proactively (tonically) suppressed, curtailing any additional 
re-active (phasic) inhibition in response to an actual distrac-
tor occurring there (Zhang et al. 2019). Similarly, as the rare 
distractor region is not tonically suppressed, the increased 
coincidence effect for this region is also as expected. How-
ever, the size of the group difference is striking: individuals 
with ASD display what looks like a ‘qualitative’ increase 
in reactive inhibition to unexpected distractors. This effect 
is not a chance finding: we still find a trace of it on the next 
trial,2 when the spatially coincident distractor (with the cur-
rent target) occurred two trials back  (distractorn–2–targetn): 
here, a significant 159-ms effect for individuals with ASD 
[t(19) = 2.1, p = 0.046, BF10 = 1.5] compares with a 35-ms 
effect for TD individuals.
Interim Discussion
Thus, the only, and striking, difference between the ASD 
and TD groups is that, in ASD, the coincidence effect was 
considerably larger, by a factor of at least five, when the 
target appeared at a previous distractor location, but only 
if the target and the previous distractor appeared in the rare 
distractor region. There are two possible explanations for 
this pattern: (1) Stronger reactive inhibition placed on—or 
‘inhibition of return’ (IOR, Klein 2000; Posner and Cohen 
1984) to—a previous distractor location in the rare region, 
which would be consistent with reports of stronger IOR in 
Fig. 4  Effect of spatial coincidence of the distractor position on trial 
n − 1 (left) or n − 2 (right) and the target position on trial n (i.e., the 
difference in RTs between distractor-absent trials n on which the cur-
rent target did vs. did not appear at the location of the distractor on 
the preceding trial n − 1 or n − 2) as a function of the target location 
on trial n (in frequent vs. rare distractor region), separately for the 
ASD and TD groups. Error bars denote one standard error
2 For this analysis, we excluded trials on which the target position on 
trial n coincided with the distractor position on trial n – 1. Also, two 
participants from each group had to be excluded because there were 
no trials for the 2-back coincidence condition in the rare region after 
excluding error trials and 1-back coincidence trials.
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individuals with ASD in a Posner-type cueing paradigm 
(Rinehart et al. 2008). Or (2), a reactively strengthened 
belief that any salience signal (indicative of the presence of 
a singleton item) arising at the same location as the distrac-
tor in the rare region on the previous trial must actually be 
caused by a distractor, rather than a target. From the perspec-
tive of a drift–diffusion model (e.g., Ratcliff et al. 2016), 
there may be a reactively strengthened decision bias towards 
identifying the item at such a location as a ‘distractor’, and 
against identifying it as a response-relevant ‘target’—involv-
ing, say, a shift of the starting point of the evidence accumu-
lation process closer to a ‘distractor’ decision and away from 
a ‘target’ decision. Although appearing similar to account 
(1), account (2) is subtly different: it is not the allocation of 
attention to the previous distractor location in the rare region 
as such that is altered (i.e., more strongly inhibited), but the 
amount of evidence that needs to be accumulated by focal-
attentional processing of the item at this location to arrive 
at a target decision.
Deciding between these alternatives is not possible based 
on the RT results alone, as RTs represent only the end of a 
whole chain of processes leading up to the final response. 
However, we can gain insight into this chain by analyzing 
the patterns of eye movements on a given (type of) trial. In 
what follows, we summarize the main findings of the eye-
movement analysis, following prior eye-movement studies 
of attentional capture (Di Caro et al. 2019; Geyer et al. 2008; 
Wang et al. 2019), though with a focus on the critical (ASD 
vs. TD differential) RT effects in the present study. Details 
of the eye-movement analyses and findings are presented in 
Supplementary.
Eye‑Movement Results
Previous ‘attentional-capture’ studies of distractor-location 
probability-cueing effects using similar stimuli to the pre-
sent study have found a reduced likelihood of oculomotor 
capture by distractors at frequent versus rare distractor loca-
tions, and potentially expedited disengagement of the eye 
from a distractor that had summoned a saccade at frequent 
versus rare locations. Also, on distractor-absent trials, sac-
cade latencies to targets appearing at the frequent distractor 
location were delayed (Wang et al. 2019). Overall, this is 
consistent with the view that distractor-location probability 
learning involves proactive inhibition of the likely distractor 
locations, and, possibly, faster disengagement of attention, 
and the eye, from distractors at these locations. Accordingly, 
we first examined whether the ASD and TD groups would 
show similar effect patterns on distractor-present and -absent 
trials.
Distractor‑Location Effects on Distractor‑Present Trials
Both participant groups required overall fewer eye move-
ments to acquire the response-critical target information 
with a distractor present in the frequent versus the rare 
distractor region [3.76 vs. 3.91 fixations, F(1, 37) = 10.11, 
p < 0.01; this effect did not significantly interact with group]. 
The main reason for this was that oculo-motor capture of the 
first saccade by the distractor was reduced [25 vs. 35%, F(1, 
37) = 9.90, p < 0.01] and, in a trade-off, first eye movements 
going straight to the target were increased with a distractor 
in the frequent, versus one in the rare, region [28 vs. 21%; 
F(1, 37) = 38.01, p < 0.001],3 for both groups. This pattern 
is consistent with learnt proactive inhibition of the frequent 
distractor region. Further, the first distractor fixations were 
marginally shorter on distractors that appeared in the fre-
quent region, as compared to distractors in the rare region 
[203 vs. 213 ms: F(1, 36) = 3.82, p = 0.06]. This indicates 
that disengagement of attention from a distractor in the fre-
quent region was expedited. Thus, replicating Wang et al.’s 
(2019) prior study with unimpaired young participants, both 
proactive inhibition of locations in the frequent distractor 
region, preventing oculo-motor capture by a distractor in 
the first instance, and, if capture prevention failed, expedited 
disengagement of the eye from a distractor in the frequent 
region contribute to the acquired (overall) RT probability-
cueing effect. This is the case equally for the ASD and the 
TD group.
Distractorn−1–Targetn Spatial‑Coincidence Effect 
on Distractor‑Absent Trials
On coincidence trials, the percentage of first saccades 
directed straight to the target tended to be increased overall 
for targets following a distractor in the rare distractor region 
[an additional 9% as compared to non-coincident trials, vs. 
an additional 1% in the frequent region, F(1, 35) = 2.71, 
p = 0.11]. If anything, this effect was stronger in individuals 
with ASD (an additional 13% in the rare region vs. 1% in 
the frequent region); that is, compared to TD individuals 
(an additional 5% in the rare vs. 2% in the frequent region), 
a greater percentage of their first saccades went directly to 
a target located in the rare region [rare region, coincident 
vs. non-coincident trials: t(19) = 2.07, p = 0.052].4 The 
3 On distractor-absent trials, by contrast, the proportion of first sac-
cades to the target was unaffected by the target location; but the sac-
cadic latencies were slower to targets appearing in the frequent vs. 
rare distractor region, for both ASD and TD individuals. See Supple-
mentary for details.
4 In both groups, compared to non-coincident trials, the onset of the 
first saccade to the target was numerically delayed, by some 40 ms, 
when the target appeared at the previous distractor location in the rare 
region [t(30) = 1.96, p = 0.06], consistent with reactive cross-trial IOR 
Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders 
1 3
increased proportion of first saccades directed to the target 
effectively rules out increased cross-trial IOR of the pre-
ceding distractor location as an explanation for why ASD 
individuals took so long to respond to a target that followed 
a distractor at the exact-same (‘coincident’) location in the 
rare region. Increased IOR would have greatly reduced the 
‘priority’ of the rare distractor location, decreasing the like-
lihood of attention, and the eye, returning there on trial on 
trial n. However, if anything, a target at this location was 
more, rather than less, likely to attract the first saccade, 
which is inconsistent with a—due to cross-trial IOR—low-
ered attention-attracting power of this item in ASD versus 
TD individuals.
However, while individuals with ASD were somewhat 
more likely to direct their first saccade to the target in the 
rare distractor region, the average number of fixations they 
took to make a response decision on coincidence, relative 
to non-coincidence, trials tended to be increased when the 
target appeared in the rare region [3.93 vs. 3.29 fixations, 
t(19) = 1.89, p = 0.07], but not for targets in the frequent 
region [3.42 vs 3.35 fixations, t(19) = 0.70, p = 0.49]; for TD 
individuals, by contrast, the number of fixations (on coinci-
dence vs. non-coincidence trials) was comparable with tar-
gets in the rare region [3.31 vs. 3.33 fixations, t(16) = − 0.08, 
p = 0.93], as well as targets in the frequent region [3.41 vs. 
3.44 fixations, t(16) = − 0.36, p = 0.72]. Thus, individu-
als with ASD required more eye movements to arrive at a 
response decision when the target followed a distractor at the 
‘coincident’ location in the rare region, accounting for their 
slowed RTs on such coincidence trials. This is the case even 
though their first saccade was, if anything, more likely to be 
directed straight to the target.
Given that the first eye movement cannot account for the 
increased ‘coincidence’ effects with spatially coincident dis-
tractors and targets in the rare region, we conducted a more 
detailed analysis of the extended oculomotor scanning pat-
terns on such trials to uncover why individuals with ASD 
require more eye movements. In particular, we partitioned 
participants’ scanning behavior on all distractor-absent trials 
into three categories based on the ‘target fixation pattern’ 
(treating multiple fixations in a row on the target as a single 
target fixation, in each category). Category 1 consisted of 
trials on which the target was fixated a single time before 
response, henceforth referred to as ‘single final target fixa-
tion’ trials; category 2: trials on which the target was fixated 
a single time, followed by multiple fixations on other items 
before response, ‘single non-final target fixation’ trials; 
and category 3: trials on which the target was fixated more 
than once, with at least one fixation of a non-target item in 
between, ‘target re-fixation’ trials.
Collapsed across coincident and non-coincident trials, the 
total dwell time spent fixating the target was longest in the 
‘single final’ condition for both groups, and similarly short 
in the ‘single non-final target fixation’ and ‘target re-fixation’ 
conditions, F(2, 62) = 23.0, p < 0.001. At the same time, the 
behavioral RT was shortest in the ‘single final’ condition, 
and longest in the ‘target re-fixation’ condition, with the 
‘single non-final’ condition in between [F(2, 62) = 123.9, 
p < 0.001]. The slow RTs in the ‘target re-fixation’ condition 
and the relatively slow RTs in the ‘single non-final target 
fixation’ condition likely reflect the fact that, on the first 
visit to the target, the target was mis-identified as a non-
target/distractor, as a result of which oculomotor inspection 
moved elsewhere before either returning to the target or its 
vicinity to extract the response-relevant information (here, 
the orientation of the bar inside the target shape). Zhaoping 
and Guyader (2007) described a similar oculomotor pattern 
in a study of saliency-driven attention allocation in stand-
ard visual search in the absence of salient distractors: even 
though the target, as the most salient item, attracted the first 
eye movement, oculomotor scanning went on to other, non-
target items before eventually returning to the target and 
responding.
Looking at the RTs as a function of the fixation pattern 
with a target in the rare distractor region, and comparing the 
critical coincident versus non-coincident trials (Fig. 5), RTs 
do not differ much between coincident and non-coincident 
trials in either the ‘single final’ (1038 vs 952 ms) or the ‘tar-
get re-fixation’ condition (1847 vs 1797 ms); they only differ 
in the ‘single non-final target fixation’ condition, where there 
is a substantial cost in responding to coincident, relative to 
non-coincident, targets (1915 vs 1352 ms). The reason for 
this may be that after sampling the target and mis-identifying 
it as a distractor or non-target, it took longer to accumulate 
information about the response-critical target feature without 
returning to the target (i.e., from eccentric vision). Since 
both groups show essentially the same pattern, this cannot 
explain why, in the ASD group, responses were particularly 
slow to coincident targets in the rare distractor region.
Accordingly, since the reaction- and dwell-time meas-
ures did not differ between the two participant groups, 
the explanation for this differential pattern must lie in 
the frequencies with which ASD and, respectively, TD 
individuals produced a particular eye-movement pattern. 
Indeed, examining the proportions of distractor-absent 
trials on which the target appeared in the rare distrac-
tor region, with the different target-fixation patterns (see 
Fig. 6) revealed the frequencies of these patterns to differ 
between coincident and non-coincident trials for the two 
groups: Both groups showed near-equivalent frequencies 
of the three target-fixation patterns on non-coincident 
of the preceding distractor location; the strength of this effect was 
comparable between ASD and TD individuals.
Footnote 4 (continued)
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trials (‘single-final target fixations’ being most frequent, at 
77%, and ‘single non-final’ and ‘target re-fixation’ patterns 
being relatively infrequent, at 8 and 15%, respectively). 
However, in the ASD group, the percentage of trials with 
the ‘single final’ pattern was reduced on coincident, as 
compared to non-coincident, trials and those with the ‘sin-
gle non-final’ and, most markedly, the ‘target re-fixation’ 
patterns were increased (51% ‘single final’, 15% ‘single 
non-final’, and 33% ‘target re-fixation’). No such change 
in the frequencies of target-fixation patterns (for coinci-
dent vs. non-coincident trials) was evident in the TD group 
(79% ‘single final’, 10% ‘single non-final’, and 10% ‘target 
re-fixation’). Chi-square tests revealed the distributions of 
target-fixation patterns to differ significantly between coin-
cident and non-coincident trials in the ASD group [Χ2(2, 
N = 1525) = 16.6, p < 0.001], but not the TD group [Χ2(2, 
N = 1607) = 0.44, p = 0.80].
Interim Discussion
This effect pattern suggests that the main reason for why 
individuals with ASD took so long to make a response to 
a target (on trial n) appearing at the previous (trial n − 1) 
distractor location in the rare region is that, although their 
eyes were initially attracted to the singleton target as effi-
ciently as in TD individuals, they then moved away from the 
target before eventually returning there (‘target re-fixation’ 
trials) or its vicinity (‘single non-final target fixation’ trials) 
and making the response decision. This is inconsistent with 
IOR-based accounts, whether they assume cross-trial IOR 
to be increased for the distractor location on the preceding 
trial n − 1 or within-trial IOR for the location first inspected 
on the current trial n. At variance with increased cross-trial 
IOR for the preceding distractor location, the (trial n) target 
at this location did attract the eye as rapidly in ASD as in 
Fig. 5  RTs on distractor-absent trials on which the target appeared in the rare distractor region, for coincident (target appearing at previous dis-
tractor location) and non-coincident trials (target appearing at non-distractor location), separately for the different target fixation patterns
Fig. 6  Proportions of trials 
with the different target-fixation 
patterns. Proportions depicted 
for (distractor-absent) trials on 
which the target appeared in the 
rare distractor region, sepa-
rately for coincident (target at 
previous distractor position) and 
non-coincident target locations 
(target at previous non-distrac-
tor location), separately for the 
ASD and TD groups
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TD individuals; and at odds with increased within-trial IOR, 
ASD individuals returned nearly as readily as TD individu-
als to the ‘coincident’ target location after having inspected 
it first (i.e., on “target re-fixation” trials).
Thus, instead, this pattern is likely to reflect a carried-
over (from the preceding trial) bias against making a ‘target’ 
decision to the item occupying the location of the preceding 
distractor in the rare region. That is, for individuals with 
ASD, having detected a distractor at this location on trial 
n − 1 disproportionately strengthens their prior belief that 
this location contains a distractor on the subsequent trial n. 
As a result, when first attending to/fixating the ‘coincident’ 
target location on trial n, they tend to mis-identify it as a 
distractor. Consequently, their search is redirected elsewhere 
and returns only later, after not having found the target at 
other display locations, to the ‘coincident’ target position.
General Discussion
The present study was designed (1) to examine at which 
processing stage(s) predictive coding is altered in ASD: 
at a pre-selective stage that decides which objects to bring 
into the focus of attention, and/or a post-selective stage 
that decides what the attended stimulus is; and (2) to deter-
mine exactly in which way perceptual decision processes 
are altered by abnormal predictive coding in ASD. To this 
end, we combined an additional-singleton visual-search task 
with a manipulation of the probability with which a salient 
but task-irrelevant distractor occurred in a particular display 
half. This paradigm had previously been used to demon-
strate that participants can learn from experience to more 
efficiently prevent attentional capture by a salient singleton 
distractor when this occurs in a frequent, as compared to a 
rare, distractor region (Sauter et al. 2018; Wang and Theeu-
wes 2018a, b; Zhang et al. 2019). Consistent with these 
studies, we found that search performance, measured by the 
manual RTs to the target, was less affected by the presence 
of an irrelevant distractor when it appeared in the frequent 
region, indicative of proactive suppression of this region. 
This probability-cueing effect was not significantly reduced 
in the ASD, compared to the TD, group; rather, both groups 
learnt and made use of the bias in the spatial distractor dis-
tribution (i.e., the ‘prior’) equally efficiently. Accordingly, at 
least with respect to distractor-location probability learning, 
it is not the acquisition of prior beliefs that is compromised 
in individuals with ASD, at variance with ‘hypo-prior’ 
accounts (Pellicano and Burr 2012) of the reduced reliance 
on prior information in ASD. An alternative possibility is 
that the autistic cognitive profile is characterized by altered 
reactions to unlikely events (signaling changes) in the envi-
ronment, in line with precision-regulation accounts (Law-
son et al. 2017). As we will argue below, altered precision 
weighting can explain the main finding of the present study, 
namely, that, compared to TD individuals, ASD individu-
als required substantially more time to respond to the target 
when it appeared at a previous distractor location, but only if 
the target fell on the same location as the preceding distrac-
tor in the rare distractor region.
One possible interpretation of this positional ‘distrac-
tor–target coincidence’ effect is that it reflects reactive, 
IOR-type inhibition placed on the distractor location, after 
the distractor had captured attention, in order to disengage 
attention from the distractor and reorient it to the target, 
and to generally prevent attention from returning there; this 
inhibitory effect could be carried over across trials (see also 
Klein 2000; Rinehart et al. 2008). However, this interpreta-
tion was effectively ruled out by our eye-tracking results, 
which showed that ASD individuals, if anything, were 
more likely to look at the target before any other item in 
the search display when it appeared at a previous distractor 
location in the rare region. Instead, the large coincidence 
effect in the ASD group originated from an increased pro-
portion of trials on which a participant, after the first visit 
to the target, moved on to search elsewhere before eventu-
ally returning to the target and responding. This ‘target re-
fixation pattern’ indicates that the target item was, on first 
inspection, mis-identified as a distractor, causing the par-
ticipant to move away and search elsewhere, before eventu-
ally returning to the target. And the increased rate of such 
mis-identifications in the rare region in ASD is indicative 
of a bias towards identifying items at a previous distractor 
location as a distractor rather than a target when the appear-
ance of a distractor at that location was surprising. This is 
in line with precision-regulation accounts, which assume an 
over-reliance on prediction errors in ASD, the consequence 
being that “every minor violation will induce new learn-
ing” (Van de Cruys et al. 2014, p. 653). When a distractor 
unexpectedly appeared at a rare location, the large predic-
tion error or ‘surprise’ produced by the distractor triggered 
new learning, giving rise to a short-lived conservative prior 
belief that items at that location are likely to be distractors. 
Distractors appearing in the frequent region, on the other 
hand, caused less surprise, and therefore would not, or to a 
lesser extent, trigger new learning (except at the very begin-
ning of the experiment) because participants quickly learnt 
to expect that distractors would frequently appear there. The 
reaction to rare distractor events is consistent with Falter 
et al.’s (2012) finding of a more conservative response bias 
in a time perception task in ASD, which might thus reflect a 
general characteristic of the autistic cognitive style, serving 
the purpose of regulating perceived environmental volatility.
However, while being consistent with a precision-regula-
tion account, this leaves open the question of how the devel-
opment of such a short-term prior is related to the learning 
of the long-term prior, the latter being responsible for the 
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distractor-location probability-cueing effect. That is, why do 
ASD individuals acquire as ‘good’ a long-term prior for the 
underlying spatial distractor distribution as TD individuals 
reducing the attention-capturing power of distractors in the 
frequent versus the rare distractor region, when they actu-
ally overreact to distractor events in the rare region, adopt-
ing a strong belief that a future items at the location of an 
established distractor in this region is likely also a distractor, 
rather than a target? Should this over-reaction not lead to a 
strengthening of spatial distractor suppression in the rare 
region, at the expense of the frequent region, resulting in a 
‘flatter’ prior compared to TD individuals?
The answer would depend on how the two, pre- and 
post-selective levels communicate. The scenario we envis-
age, based on prior considerations (Sauter et al. 2020), is 
illustrated in Fig. 7. Plausibly, the long-term prior about 
the spatial distractor distribution is indeed acquired from 
observers’ explicit experience of distractor events: the most 
salient item in the display captures attention, and the eye, 
and is explicitly identified and ‘rejected’ as a task-irrelevant 
Fig. 7  Illustration of the interaction between pre-attentive and post-
selective processing and the updating of the associated long- and 
short-term priors. In the depicted trial N − 1, the highly salient sin-
gleton distractor (see saliency map) in the rare distractor region 
generates a strong attentional-priority signal (1), capturing the first 
saccade and bringing the distractor into the focus of attention. After 
identifying it as a distractor (2), reactive inhibition (3) is applied to its 
location on the priority map, reducing the distractor peak below the 
peak of the target. This triggers the second saccade to the next most 
salient item, the target, which is then identified as such and a man-
ual response is issued (4). Applying reactive inhibition to a distrac-
tor location updates the long-term prior of the distractor-frequency 
map (5), which regulates the amount of proactive inhibition applied 
to the various locations in the frequent and rare regions (essentially a 
location-specific scaling factor applied to the saliency signals in com-
puting attentional priority). At the post-selective stage, identifying the 
item fixated first as a distractor is compared to the likelihood of a dis-
tractor occurring at this location (6), which is represented by the map 
of the long-term inhibition prior; in the example, this likelihood was 
low as the distractor occurred in the rare region. This yields a predic-
tion error (‘surprise’), which is used to adjust the starting point (S0) 
of the evidence-accumulation process towards the distractor bound-
ary; in the example, the prediction error was big, bringing about a 
large shift of S0 towards the ‘distractor’ boundary. That is, the S0 val-
ues are dynamically updated and buffered in a short-term ‘target/dis-
tractor belief’ map, which then influences the post-selective decisions 
on the next trial. ASD individuals assign a greater weight to the pre-
diction error, translating into a larger shift of S0 towards a ‘distractor’ 
decision. When, on the next trial, a target appears at the previous dis-
tractor location (in the rare region), it produces a strong priority sig-
nal (proactive inhibition is weak for locations in the rare region) and, 
thus, attracts the eye immediately (7). However, given a noisy (‘jit-
tery’) evidence accumulation process, the shift of S0 towards the dis-
tractor boundary (carried over from the previous trial) will increase 
the chance of incorrect ‘distractor’ decisions (i.e., the accumulated 
evidence reaching the ‘distractor’, rather than the ‘target’, boundary) 
(8). This leads to an extended search process (involving the scanning 
of other, non-target locations) until the target is eventually detected
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distractor. However, to find the target, identification of an 
item as a distractor at the post-selective stage would have 
to be followed by inhibition of its priority signal (its peak) 
on the search-guiding priority map, so that attention can be 
disengaged from the distractor and re-oriented to the target, 
whose location is ‘flagged’ by the second highest peak on 
the priority map (see Fig. 7). This process of reactive posi-
tional inhibition of ‘rejected’ locations—conceived of as an 
IOR-type process (e.g., Koch and Ullman 1985)—is likely 
to provide the ‘(error) signal’ for the learning of the pre-
selective (inhibition) prior. Given that more distractors occur 
in the frequent region, more IOR-type ‘rejection’ signals 
are generated in this region, biasing pro-active, tonic inhibi-
tion at the pre-selective stage towards the likely distractor 
region. On this account, the amount of reactive inhibition 
required to release attention from a distractor that captured 
attention and the eye depends on the relative strength of 
the distractor versus the target priority signals, not on the 
strength of the prediction error. The latter, however, is used 
to update the post-selective distractor/target ‘belief’, that is, 
the expected likelihood of a distractor-vs.-target event at the 
post-selective decision stage. In our paradigm, the likelihood 
that a selected item is a target is equal for all display loca-
tions; however, while the likelihood that the selected item 
is a distractor is similarly high for locations in the frequent 
distractor region, it is much lower than the target likelihood 
for locations in the rare region. Thus, when a distractor in 
the rare region captures attention, it creates a large predic-
tion error, and this leads to an adjustment of the short-term 
post-selective target/distractor belief towards a ‘distractor’ 
decision (Fig. 7 right-upper panel for an illustration). Indi-
viduals with ASD assign a greater weight to this prediction 
error, so the result is an overadjustment compared to TD 
individuals. However, in ASD, only the strength of this post-
selective belief is increased for distractors in the rare region, 
but not the strength of the priority signals they generate. 
The latter determines the likelihood that such a distractor 
captures attention, which was not higher in ASD compared 
to TD individuals. Accordingly, there would be no reason 
why individuals with ASD would differ from TD individu-
als in terms of the long-term inhibition prior they develop.
According to recent theoretical considerations, the aber-
rant social-cognitive development in ASD arises, at least 
in part, from attentional atypicalities, such as in attentional 
re-orienting (Keehn et al. 2013, 2016; Orekhova and Stro-
ganova 2014; Spaniol et al. 2018). Yet, the current results 
show entirely intact low-level mechanisms of attentional-pri-
ority regulation in individuals with ASD, and what, on the 
behavioral level, appears like a re-orienting deficit (slowed 
responses to ‘coincident’ targets) rather reflects altered post-
selective decision processes, in particular, over-adjustment 
of decision parameters upon encountering surprising stimuli. 
Thus, speculatively, individuals with ASD control surprise 
not just in complex scenarios where surprise avoidance 
goes along with behavioral rigidity; rather, mirroring these 
higher-level processes, they attempt to regulate surprise 
down to the level of simple perceptual decision-making.
The results of the current study need to be interpreted in 
the light of our sample consisting of high-functioning adults 
with ASD, limiting generalisability to the whole spectrum. 
The reason for this limitation is the ethical consideration 
that new paradigms should first be tested with participants 
who can consent for themselves. Our findings can now form 
the basis for future studies testing replicability in children 
with ASD and individuals with comorbid learning disability.
We conclude that individuals with ASD can, to an equal 
degree as TD individuals, make use of prior information 
about where an irrelevant distractor is most likely to appear 
when deciding where to direct attention. However, when a 
distractor appears at an unlikely, ‘surprising’ location, indi-
viduals with ASD are more likely to overreact by coming to 
expect future items occurring at that position to be distrac-
tors, which makes them prone to fail to correctly identify 
targets appearing at that location. This pattern could reflect 
a general tendency of individuals with ASD to assign atypi-
cally high weight to perceptual prediction errors, even when 
such prediction errors cannot be eliminated by further learn-
ing and so should be ignored as irrelevant noise, as has been 
suggested by some predictive-coding theories of autism.
There is a consensus that understanding the sensory 
abnormalities in ASD—such as why people with ASD 
can be overly sensitive to sensory input—is of paramount 
theoretical importance (Autistica 2016), and the predictive-
coding framework has high potential in explaining this per-
ceptual and cognitive aspect of ASD. The current findings 
add towards a refinement of this approach by suggesting that 
overrating of prediction errors and undue adjustment of prior 
beliefs, especially in response to unexpected events, might 
contribute to the sensory oversensitivity that is characteristic 
of ASD.
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